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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: lAS PART 36 
-----------------------------------------X 
TRILBY J. TENER, M.D. 
Plaintiff, 
-against-
MIRIAM CREMER, M. D., et al. , 
Defendants. 
-----------------------------------------x 
DORIS LING-COHAN, J.S.C.: 
BACKGROUND 
Index No. 104583/10 
Motion Seq. No. 003 
This is a suit by plaintiff doctor, Trilby J. Tener, for, 
inter alia, two million dollars arising out of an allegedly 
defamatory posting about plaintiff on a website known as and doing 
business as WWW.yitals.com (Vitals). Defendant Miriam Cremer, 
M.D., moves for an order dismissing the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 
3 211 ( a ) ( 5 ) and ( 7) . 
The single anonymous statement (Statement) which gave rise to 
this action was first published on April 12, 2009 on the Vitals 
website, an on-line forum expressly dedicated to opinions about 
doctors so that people may comment on and rate medical 
professionals for the benefit of others seeking opinions and 
information about such professionals. The Statement read: IIDr. 
Tener is a terrible doctor. She is mentally unstable and has poor 
skills. Stay far awayl" The complaint alleges that plaintiff 
discovered the Statement on May 28, 2009, when an on-line search of 
her name on the web site www.google.com. referred her to Vitals. 
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DISCUSSION 
Dismissal Based on Untimeliness 
CPLR 215 (3) provides that claims sounding in libel or slander 
must be commenced within one year. In Firth v State of New York 
(98 NY2d 365 r 370 [2002]) r the Court held that the "single 
publication" ruler pursuant to which a defamation claim accrues 
upon the first publication of the offending statement r is 
applicable to statements posted on the internet. ConsequentlYr 
plaintiff had until April 11, 2010, to commence this action. A few 
days prior to the expiration date, on April 8, 2010, plaintiff 
filed a summons with notice, naming as defendants Pamela Wilkie, 
and a number of "Doe" s, but failed to mention moving defendant, Dr. 
Cremer. It was not until a several months past the expiration 
date, on June 8, 2010, however, that plaintiff filed an amended 
summons r removing Ms. Wilkie 1 , as a responsible party, and 
substituting Dr. Cremer. 
Plaintiff contends that this action is timely, because it was 
commenced pursuant to CPLR 1024. CPLR 1024 allows a party 
who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or 
identity of a person who may properly be made a partYr 
[to] proceed against such person as an unknown party by 
designating so much of his name .and identity as is known. 
An action commenced pursuant to filing under CPLR 1024 tolls the 
statute of limitations (Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 
26 [2d Dept 2009] i Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261 [1st Dept 2002]) / 
and CPLR 306-b affords the plaintiff an additional 120 days within 
lPamela Wilkie/s name is also spelt "Willkie" in Plaintiffrs 
Affidavit in Opposition. (Para.24, Footnote 7). 
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which to identify and to serve the proper defendant. However, this 
extraordinary procedure is not without limits: a plaintiff seeking 
to proceed pursuant to CPLR 1024 must "demonstrate[] that he [or 
she] conducted a diligent inquiry into the actual identities of the 
intended defendants before the expiration of the statutory period. " 
Goldberg v Boatmax: I I, Inc., 41 AD3d 255, 256 (1st Dept 2007) 
(emphasis supplied, citing Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261); see also 
Erdogan v Toothsavers Dental Servo P.C., 57 AD3d 314 (1st Dept 
2008). As explained further below,here, plaintiff failed to make 
the timely efforts to identify the defendant that would entitle. her 
to avail herself of the special procedural mechanism provided by 
the CPLR. 
The complaint alleges, and plaintiff's affidavit states that, 
the day after she read the Statement, she contacted Vitals and 
sought to have the Statement expunged. Allegedly, she learned that 
the best that she could do was to open her own account with Vitals, 
which would permit her to "hide" the Statement. According to 
plaintiff, she successfully hid the Statement shortly thereafter, 
and then continued to seek ways to remove the Statement from the 
Vitals web site. 
The complaint further alleges that plaintiff "immediately 
initiated a proceeding to compel Vitals to provide information" 
that would help plaintiff identify the person who had posted the 
Statement. Complaint, at 24. However, in actuality, plaintiff did 
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not commence that proceeding 2 until March 26, 2010 - almost 10 
months after she first discovered the Statement, and only 16 days 
before her time to commence this action ran. 3 Indeed, plaintiff 
admits in her affidavit that she had the wherewithal to consult an 
attorney acquaintance shortly after discovering the posting, who 
discouraged her, but only finally retained counsel belatedly on or 
about March 23, 2010 (almost 10 months after her discovery of the 
statement). Prior to that time, (despite her swift action to hide 
the offending post) she apparently merely confined her 
investigation to merely reviewing her e-mails and correspondence, 
in attempting to ascertain the identity of the person who had 
posted the Statement. Such activity, however, does not constitute 
2 Such proceeding was titled In the Matter of Trilby J. 
Tener, M.D. v MDX Medical Inc. and/or its subsidiary, 
www.vitals.com (Index No. 103972/2010) ("Tener v. MDX"). 
In Tener v. MDX, Hon. Alice Schlesinger expressed 
skepticism as to this matter and stated on the record: 
"This matter is before me and it sounds in pre-action 
discovery. When this was first brought in as an order 
to show cause, I had some doubts -as to whether or not 
I wanted to sign the order to show cause at all because 
what it essentially was, was asking for information to 
be used in a lawsuit sounding in defamation against, at 
this point, an anonymous poster who had made some 
unfavorable comments that referred to Dr. Trilby Tener. 
She is a medical doctor. Specifically what those 
comments were that Dr. Tener was 'a terrible doctor', 
that she had 'poor skills' and that she was 'mentally 
unstable' and finally to 'stay far away'. Presumably 
that was a direction to the reader to stay far away . 
I had serious doubts because there was a question in my 
mind whether those statements would even give rise to 
a defamation suit because they sound very much as 
opinions as opposed to stating facts and opinion is 
protected expression, pursuant to the First Amendment". 
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a diligent effort to ascertain the identity of the person who 
should be a defendant, and plaintiff's last moment retention of an 
attorney, less than three weeks before the expiration of the one-
year period, does not make this action timely. Where a plaintiff 
relies upon CPLR 1024, the plaintiff I s efforts to identify the 
proper defendant are not timely when they are first undertaken 
shortly before the expiration of the limitations period, as 
occurred herein. Fountain v Ocean View II Assoc., 266 AD2d 339 (2d 
Dept 1999) i see also Justin v Orahan, 14 AD3d 492 (2d Dept 2005) . 
Thus, plaintiff's inexplicable and belated attempts to ascertain 
the true identity of the poster do not warrant the special 
protection of CPLR 1024. 
Plaintiff contends that the instant motion is premature, 
because this court has not yet held the hearing provided for by the 
September 22, 2011 Appellate Division decision, as to the 
feasibility and cost of the retrieval of certain electronically 
stored information by non-party New York University Langone Medical 
Center. 'I See Tener v Cremer, 89 AD3d 75 (1st Dept 2011). 
The underlying motion for contempt, which was denied 
by this court in its September 9, 2010 decision, was filed by 
plaintiff against non-party NYU Langone Medical Center, when, in 
response to a subpoena, it had indicated to plaintiff that it could 
not retrieve the computer information that plaintiff sought from 
such not-for-profit medical institution. 
In the appeal of the order denying contempt, the 
Appellate Division reversed this court's order dated September 9, 
2010 (denying contempt against a non-party), utilizing reply papers 
that were submitted to the Appellate Division as part of the 
appellate record, which had not been received or used by this Part 
(as specifically reflected in this court's September 9, 2010 
decision), given that such reply papers were not included in the 
motion papers submitted to this Part. 
Subsequently, (when this court became aware that 
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the Appellate Division rendered its decision utilizing reply papers 
that this court did not have the benefit of reviewing) this court 
issued an order dated November 28, 2011, requiring an explanation 
as to why the appellate "record" was markedly different than the 
submissions before this Part and the court file (having also 
reviewed the entire court file, which showed an absence of 
plaintiff's reply). 
In 'response, significantly, the parties and non-party NYU 
Langone Medical Center did not dispute that such reply papers were 
not part of the record on which I had based my September 9, 2010 
decision/order. 
Specifically, while plaintiff has cleared up part of the 
mystery of how her reply (which submitted, for the first time, an 
expert's affidavit) was made a part of the appellate "record" 
(given that it appears that such reply had been submitted to the 
prior judge's court attorney, who apparently did not place it with 
the motion file or case file, and was missing upon the motion 
file's transfer to this Part for decision), plaintiff has. 
nonetheless, utterly not refuted that such reply was never 
submitted to this Part , and hence clearly not considered when 
rendering the September 9,2010 decision, which denied contempt 
against non-party NYU Langone Medical Center. 
Nor has plaintiff answered the question of why she simply 
did not make a motion to renew/reargue (a routine and inexpensive 
procedural mechanism to re-visit an issue before the court), upon 
receipt of my September 9, 2010 decision, which clearly indicated 
in the recitation of papers portion that only four (4) documents 
were considered: "Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause ... 1,2" and 
Answering Affidavits ... 3,4", with the "Reply Affidavit" space left 
noticeably and intentionally blank. Moreoyer, the body of the 
decision specifically mentioned the absence of any reply submitted 
by plaintiff: "This [non-party NYU Langone Medical Center's] 
allegation is unrefuted as a reply affidavit contradicting such 
allegations has not been supplied." (emphasis supplied). 
The court notes that attorneys routinely check such 
recitation of papers and file such motions to renew/reargue, 
regularly. If plaintiff's counsel had employed such a routine 
procedural mechanism, considerable resources on all sides, 
including his client's financial resources, the defendant's, the 
non-party NYU Langone Medical Center's and the Appellate Division's 
(which was forced to consider an appellate "record" markedly 
different than the submissions provided to this trial judge), would 
not have been wasted. 
Incredibly, instead of employing this simple procedural 
mechanism, plaintiff (who complains of "defamation") and her counsel 
have decided that the better avenue to take was to make blatantly 
inappropriate and wild accusations against this court of "bias" and 
"apparent impropriety", after allegedly conducting "Internet 
research" into this court's background and raising an extremely 
attenuated "connection" to non-party NYU Langone Medical Center, 
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Plaintiff believes that such information might help identify the 
person who posted the Statement. While the court is sympathetic to 
plaintiff's desire to ascertain the identity of that person, such 
identification would not cure the untimeliness of this action, let 
alone the untimeliness of an action against a defendant other than 
Dr. Cremer. 
The court notes that, significantly, the subpoena, which was 
served to obtain such electronically stored information from non-
party NYU Langone Medical CenterS was not served until on or about 
April 30, 2010, after the applicable statute of limitations had 
already run. Thus, the within action is not timely and must be 
dismissed. 
Dismissal for Failure to State a Cause of Action 
Additionally, as explained further below, even if this action 
was found to be timely, dismissal is warranted for failure to state 
a cause of action, as the alleged defamatory statements are 
that I attended a completely distinct entity: NYU Law School- over 
30 years ago. 
Plaintiff also bases an unwarranted claim of bias merely 
because she disagrees with the issuance of the November 28, 2011 
order, which simply requested an explanation as to how an appellate 
court was able to review an "appellate record" markedly different 
than the one this trial court considered, as no reply was submitted 
to this Part or considered in rendering the September 9, 2010 
decision denying contempt. 
See also footnote 9, infra, for a detailed discussion on 
plaintiff's unwarranted accusations. 
This non-party subpoena was the subject of the September 
22, 2011 Appellate Division decision. 
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statements of opinion, and, thus, are not actionable. Expressions 
of opinion are distinct from assertions of fact and cannot be the 
subject of an action for defamation. Mann v. Abel, 10 NY3d 271, 
276 (2008) (citing Weiner v. Doubleday and Co., 74 NY2d 586, 593 
(1989) ) . 
Here, the statement was posted, anonymously, on an Internet 
message board - a format and forum commonly used by unidentified 
wri ters to make unsupported and often baseless as sertions of 
opinions. Such website specifically calls for opinions as to 
medical doctors. The anonymous statement contains no accompanying 
factual description and no details describing any particular 
interaction that the poster may have had with Dr. Tener. Indeed, 
as plaintiff herself concedes, the posting "was made alone without 
factual support to the statement. u PI.'s Opp.Brief at 8. 
Further, in a claim for defamation, "the words must be 
construed in the context of the entire statement as a whole, tested 
against the understanding of the average reader, and if not 
reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, they are not 
actionable." Dillon v. Ci ty of New York, 261 AD2d 34, 38 (1st Dept 
1999) . Here, the Vitals. com website, specifically states in its 
"Terms of use U that, "Vitals and the Content include statements of 
opinion and not statements of fact . .. " (emphasis supplied). 6 Wang 
Aff. Ex. 2. Thus, any reasonable person using Vitals.com has been 
The court notes that, in opposition, plaintiff has not 
argued that such "Terms of use" were not in effect at the time of 
the subject posting. 
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expressly put on notice that the postings contained on such website 
are mere opinions, and not based upon facts. 
As stated by the Appellate Division, First Department in 
Sandals Resorts Intl. Ltd. v. Google, Inc., (86 AD3d 32 [pt Dept 
2011J), a case involving allegedly defamatory anonymous emails sent 
to multiple undisclosed recipients that criticized the 
corporation's treatment of native Jamaicans, in affirming 
dismissal: 
readers give less credence to allegedly defamatory 
remarks published on the Internet than to similar remarks 
made in other contexts ... Indeed, the anonymity ... makes it 
more likely that a reasonable reader would view its 
assertions with some skepticism and tend to treat it 
contents as opinion rather than as fact. 
Id. at 44 (emphasis supplied). Significantly, the First Department 
further instructed that, 
[t] he culture of Internet communications, as distinct 
from that of print media such as newspapers and 
magazines, has been characterized as encouraging a 
'freewheeling, anything-goes writing style' ... ' 'It is 
imperative that courts learn to view libel allegations 
wi thin the unique context of the Internet. In determining 
whether a plaintiff's complaint includes a published 
"false and defamatory statement concerning another", 
commentators have argued that the defamatory import of 
the communication must be viewed in light of the fact 
that bulletin boards and chat rooms "are often the 
repository of a wide range .of casual, emotive, and 
imprecise speech," and that the online "recipients of 
[offensive] statements do not necessarily attribute the 
BaIne level of credence to the statements [that] they 
would accord to statements made in other contexts". 
Id. at 43-44 (citations omittedj emphasis supplied).7 Thus, in 
Sandals Resorts IntI. Ltd. I 
discovery of an alleged defamation 
Division denied. 
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supra, 
claim, 
involved pre-action 
which the Appellate 
accordance with the prevailing case law in this Department, 
plaintiff has failed to assert an actionable claim.s 
Defendant's and plaintiff's9 further requests, which were not 
Defendant has also raised the issue that plaintiff's 
original summons was jurisdictionally defective, which this court 
need not reach. 
The court notes that, while plaintiff has not, in fact, 
filed a notice of motion seeking the recusal of this court on this 
matter, plaintiff has made such request by letters to the court, to 
the Supervising Judge, and in her attorney's affirmation in 
opposition to the within motion. Overland Aff.in Opp., ~8-9. It is 
hornbook law, however, that requests of the court are to be made by 
notice of motion, in order to provide notice, to allow parties an 
opportunity to submit opposition, rather than inserted randomly in 
submissions or by letters to the Judge. See CPLR 2214 (a) . 
Moreover, there is no provision in the CPLR which authorizes motion 
practice by letter. The high volume of this Court's case-load, 
makes letter writing an extremely difficult, if not impossible 
tool, to address parties' requests and concerns. Plaintiff's 
outlandish claim with respect to recusal does not merit a response, 
but, undoubtedly, will be raised on appeal by plaintiff; 
therefore, the court will briefly address it. 
Apparently, in seeking recusal, based on alleged "Internet 
research" conducted as to this court's "background", plaintiff's 
counsel relies on his client's accusations without a filter. 
Ironically and incredibly, plaintiff (who complains of 
"defamationU ) and her attorney, have accused this court of being 
biased against plaintiff, in favor of a non-party, NYU Langone 
Medical Center, claiming that I attended and received funding to 
attend school from a totally distinct entity under NYU's massive 
umbrella of institutions: NYU Law School. 
While plaintiff is correct that I graduated from NYU Law 
School -over 30 years ago- I note that at least one of the 
Appellate Division judges who presided over the previous appeal in 
this case, if not more, did so as well; yet, plaintiff made no 
such request for recusal at the Appellate Division. Not 
surprisingly, plaintiff only requested recusal, when this court 
issued rulings, which she did not agree with, concluding that the 
only reason is that it "must have u been the result of "bias". 
Further, plaintiff and her attorney are absolutely incorrect 
in their assertion that NYU funded a scholarship for my law school 
education, which, ironically, points to the inherent danger of 
relying on "Internet research". Nor does plaintiff's raising of the 
spector of "appearance of impropriety" form a basis of recusal. 
Plaintiff's allegations of recusal amount to nothing more than a 
"sour grapes" litigation tactic. " [W]hen there is no ground for 
recusal, recusal should not be ordered." Silber v. Silber, 84 AD3d 
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included in the notice of motion as part of the relief being sought 
are denied. See CPLR 2214(a). 
Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is granted, and the 
complaint is dismissed with costs as calculated by the Clerk of the 
Court upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it 
is further 
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment 
accordingly; and it is further 
ORDERED that within 45 days of entry of this order, 
defendant shall serve a copy upon plaintiff, with notice of entry. 
Doris Ling-Cohan, J.S.C. 
J; \DiBmi~B\TENER . cremer . final.wpd F, LED 
AUG 01 20'2 
NEW YORK 
COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE 
931,932 (2nd Dept 2011) i see also People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 
(1987), Katz v Denzer, 70 AD2d 548, 548-549 (1st Dept 1979) i R & R 
Capital LLC v Merritt, 56 AD3d 370, 370 (1st Dept 2008). 
Moreover, as NYU (Medical Center, Law or any other part of 
NYU) is not even a party to this case, recusal is absolutely not 
warranted. 
See alsofootnote 4, supra, which also addresses plaintiff's 
claims of recusal. 
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